This week, seven Florida capital cases were decided by the United States Supreme Court (SCOTUS) as the High Court issued its orders denying future consideration of requests made by Florida Death Row inmates.
All of these cases ask SCOTUS to review decisions made by the Florida Supreme Court as it applies the SCOTUS decision in Hurst v. Florida.
We’ve discussed Hurst before; in sum, SCOTUS found the Florida death penalty statute was unconstitutional because juries did not decide whether or not there were sufficient aggravating factors to impose death (under the law, the judge decided on capital punishment). When Hurst came down, it meant that Florida Death Row inmates who were sentenced to death under an unconstitutional process were due new sentencing trials. They began filing appeals, among them these seven whose writs were denied this Tuesday.
See:
- Court Rules on Post-Hurst Sentencing Hearings; and
- What Does the New Hurst Decision Mean for Florida Death Penalty?
Seven Florida Petitions Based Upon Hurst Denied by SCOTUS This Week
Specifically, the seven Florida capital cases are as follows (linked to their respective SCOTUS Docket pages):
11-13-18 Order: Petition DENIED. Justice Thomas, concurring in the denial of certiorari: I concur for the reasons set out in Reynolds v. Florida, 586 U. S. ___ (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Sotomayor, dissenting from the denial of certiorari: I dissent for the reasons set out in Reynolds v. Florida, 586 U. S. ___ (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
11-13-18 Order: Petition DENIED. Justice Thomas, concurring in the denial of certiorari: I concur for the reasons set out in Reynolds v. Florida, 586 U. S. ___ (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Sotomayor, dissenting from the denial of certiorari: I dissent for the reasons set out in Reynolds v. Florida, 586 U. S. ___ (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
11-13-18 Order: Petition DENIED. Justice Thomas, concurring in the denial of certiorari: I concur for the reasons set out in Reynolds v. Florida, 586 U. S. ___ (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Sotomayor, dissenting from the denial of certiorari: I dissent for the reasons set out in Reynolds v. Florida, 586 U. S. ___ (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
11-13-18 Order: Petition DENIED. Justice Thomas, concurring in the denial of certiorari: I concur for the reasons set out in Reynolds v. Florida, 586 U. S. ___ (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Sotomayor, dissenting from the denial of certiorari: I dissent for the reasons set out in Reynolds v. Florida, 586 U. S. ___ (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
11-13-18 Order: Petition DENIED. Justice Thomas, concurring in the denial of certiorari: I concur for the reasons set out in Reynolds v. Florida, 586 U. S. ___ (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Sotomayor, dissenting from the denial of certiorari: I dissent for the reasons set out in Reynolds v. Florida, 586 U. S. ___ (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
11-13-18 Order: Petition DENIED. Statement of Justice Breyer respecting the denial of certiorari. (Detached). Justice Thomas, concurring in the denial of certiorari. (Detached Opinion). Justice Sotomayor, dissenting from denial of certiorari. (Detached Opinion).
11-13-18 Order: Petition DENIED. Justice Thomas, concurring in the denial of certiorari: I concur for the reasons set out in Reynolds v. Florida, 586 U. S. ___ (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Sotomayor, dissenting from the denial of certiorari: I dissent for the reasons set out in Reynolds v. Florida, 586 U. S. ___ (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Revelation of Three Justices’ Viewpoints on Death Penalty
Most of the Justices simply agreed with the order denying writ; however, three felt passionately enough about the issue to write on the subject. Sotomayor dissented; both Thomas and Breyer concurred.
1. Sotomayor Dissent
Once again, Justice Sotomayor dissented in these death penalty cases arguing that the petitions for writ of certiorari should have been granted. She writes that while each of the seven petitions deal with “gruesome crimes” there should be consideration of the constitutional issues raised by the Death Row Inmates.
From Justice Sotomayor’s Dissent in Reynolds:
“Today, this Court denies the petitions of seven capital defendants, each of whom was sentenced to death under a capital sentencing scheme that this Court has since declared unconstitutional. The Florida Supreme Court has left the petitioners’ death sentences undisturbed, reasoning that any sentencing error in their cases was harmless. Petitioners challenge the Florida Supreme Court’s analysis because it treats the fact of unanimous jury recommendations in their cases as highly significant, or legally dispositive, even though those juries were told repeatedly that their verdicts were merely advisory. I have dissented before from this Court’s failure to intervene on this issue. Petitioners’ constitutional claim is substantial and affects numerous capital defendants. The consequence of error in these cases is too severe to leave petitioners’ challenges unanswered, and I therefore would grant the petitions.
“[T]his Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has taken as a given that capital sentencers would view their task as the serious one of determining whether a specific human being should die at the hands of the State.” Caldwell, 472 U. S., at 329. The jurors in petitioners’ cases were repeatedly instructed that their role was merely advisory, yet the Florida Supreme Court has treated their recommendations as legally binding by way of its harmlesserror analysis. This approach raises substantial Eighth Amendment concerns. As I continue to believe that “the stakes in capital cases are too high to ignore such constitutional challenges,” Truehill v. Florida, 583 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (slip op., at 2), I would grant review to decide whether the Florida Supreme Court’s harmless-error approach is valid in light of Caldwell. This Court’s refusal to address petitioners’ challenges signals that it is unwilling to decide this issue. I respectfully dissent from the denial of certiorari, and I will continue to note my dissent in future cases raising the Caldwell question.”
2. Thomas Concurrence
Justice Thomas concurred with the decision to deny these petitions; he is clear it has already been decided the Eighth Amendment (against cruel and unusual punishment) is not violated by the death penalty.
From the Reynolds concurrence by Justice Thomas:
“JUSTICE BREYER’s final (and actual) concern is with the “‘death penalty itself.’” Ante, at 4. As I have elsewhere explained, “it is clear that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the death penalty.” Baze v. Rees, 553 U. S 35, 94 (2008) (opinion concurring in judgment); see Glossip, supra, at ___–___, and n. 1 (THOMAS, J., concurring) (slip op., at 1–2, and n. 1). The only thing “cruel and unusual” in this case was petitioner’s brutal murder of three innocent victims.”
3. Breyer Concurrence
There is also a concurrence from Justice Breyer, where he explains his position on these denials. He does express concerns about capital punishment in this country – not on the act itself, but in how long it is taking to execute those sentenced to death. He calls the delays “unconscionable.” He also has concerns about the retroactive application of Hurst and how judges and juries make the decision to sentence the accused to death (in Florida and elsewhere).
From Justice Breyer’s concurrence:
“It seems to me that the jurors in at least some of these cases might not have made a “community-based judgment” that a death sentence was “proper retribution” had they known at the time of sentencing (1) that the death penalty might not be administered for another 40 years or more; (2) that other defendants who were sentenced years later would be entitled to resentencing based on a later-discovered error, but that the defendants in question would not be entitled to the same remedy for roughly the same error; or (3) that the jury’s death recommendation would be treated as if it were decisive, despite the judge’s instruction that the jury’s recommendation was merely advisory. Had jurors known about these issues at the time of sentencing, some might have hesitated before recommending a death sentence. At least a few might have recommended a life sentence instead. The result is that some defendants who have lived under threat of execution for decades might never have been sentenced to death in the first place.
“The flaws in the current practice of capital punishment could often cast serious doubt on the death sentences imposed in these and other capital cases. Rather than attempting to address the flaws in piecemeal fashion, however, I remain of the view that “it would be wiser to reconsider the root cause of the problem—the constitutionality of the death penalty itself.”