Sidebar With an Expert Capital Litigator
Liz Green is the brainchild behind a new BBC Radio documentary dealing with capital punishment, it’s entitled "Death Row, A Journey From West Yorkshire to The Execution Chambers Of America."
It’s worth your time: of note, this documentary is a finalist in the New York International Radio Festival Awards.
Conceived, written, produced and presented…
The Senate has passed the Timely Justice Bill and now all that it needs to become Florida law is the approval of Florida Governor Rick Scott.
Today, there is an excellent piece in the Sun Sentinel on what this means to justice in the Sunshine State: it’s written by Gary Stein and it’s worth your…
For details on these bills, check out our post from last month.
Out of the three the proposed "Timely Justice Act" seems to be moving forward with some strength, as Senate Bill 1750 has been scheduled on the Appropriations’ Committee agenda tomorrow morning (04/18/13, 9:00 am, 412 Knott Building, Tallahassee, Florida in case you’re…
The continuing battle over indigent defense attorneys fees in death penalty cases continues in the State of Florida as a new opinion has come out of the 1st District Court of Appeals, Fletcher v. Justice Administrative Commission (read the opinion here).
The Petition for Writ of Certiorari was granted and the case remanded…
On March 18, 1963, the United States Supreme Court opinion in Gideon v. Wainwright came down, and with it the right to counsel for those who cannot afford their own lawyer began to be respected and protected in this country.
In celebration of this historic precedent coming out of the State of Florida, and given the reality that there will be lots of discussion on the ramifications of Gideon v. Wainwright (pro and con) in other media, here is the majority opinion from the case itself, written by Justice Hugo Black all those years ago:
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Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1983)
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner was charged in a Florida state court with having broken and entered a poolroom with intent to commit a misdemeanor. This offense is a felony under 337*337 Florida law. Appearing in court without funds and without a lawyer, petitioner asked the court to appoint counsel for him, whereupon the following colloquy took place:
"The COURT: Mr. Gideon, I am sorry, but I cannot appoint Counsel to represent you in this case. Under the laws of the State of Florida, the only time the Court can appoint Counsel to represent a Defendant is when that person is charged with a capital offense. I am sorry, but I will have to deny your request to appoint Counsel to defend you in this case.
"The DEFENDANT: The United States Supreme Court says I am entitled to be represented by Counsel."
Put to trial before a jury, Gideon conducted his defense about as well as could be expected from a layman. He made an opening statement to the jury, cross-examined the State’s witnesses, presented witnesses in his own defense, declined to testify himself, and made a short argument "emphasizing his innocence to the charge contained in the Information filed in this case." The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and petitioner was sentenced to serve five years in the state prison. Later, petitioner filed in the Florida Supreme Court this habeas corpus petition attacking his conviction and sentence on the ground that the trial court’s refusal to appoint counsel for him denied him rights "guaranteed by the Constitution and the Bill of Rights by the United States Government."[1]
Treating the petition for habeas corpus as properly before it, the State Supreme Court, "upon consideration thereof" but without an opinion, denied all relief. Since 1942, when Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455, was decided by a divided 338*338 Court, the problem of a defendant’s federal constitutional right to counsel in a state court has been a continuing source of controversy and litigation in both state and federal courts.[2] To give this problem another review here, we granted certiorari. 370 U. S. 908. Since Gideon was proceeding in forma pauperis, we appointed counsel to represent him and requested both sides to discuss in their briefs and oral arguments the following: "Should this Court’s holding in Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455, be reconsidered?"
I.
The facts upon which Betts claimed that he had been unconstitutionally denied the right to have counsel appointed to assist him are strikingly like the facts upon which Gideon here bases his federal constitutional claim. Betts was indicated for robbery in a Maryland state court. On arraignment, he told the trial judge of his lack of funds to hire a lawyer and asked the court to appoint one for him. Betts was advised that it was not the practice in that county to appoint counsel for indigent defendants except in murder and rape cases. He then pleaded not guilty, had witnesses summoned, cross-examined the State’s witnesses, examined his own, and chose not to testify himself. He was found guilty by the judge, sitting without a jury, and sentenced to eight years in prison. 339*339 Like Gideon, Betts sought release by habeas corpus, alleging that he had been denied the right to assistance of counsel in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Betts was denied any relief, and on review this Court affirmed. It was held that a refusal to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant charged with a felony did not necessarily violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which for reasons given the Court deemed to be the only applicable federal constitutional provision. The Court said:
"Asserted denial [of due process] is to be tested by an appraisal of the totality of facts in a given case. That which may, in one setting, constitute a denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice, may, in other circumstances, and in the light of other considerations, fall short of such denial." 316 U. S., at 462.
Treating due process as "a concept less rigid and more fluid than those envisaged in other specific and particular provisions of the Bill of Rights," the Court held that refusal to appoint counsel under the particular facts and circumstances in the Betts case was not so "offensive to the common and fundamental ideas of fairness" as to amount to a denial of due process. Since the facts and circumstances of the two cases are so nearly indistinguishable, we think the Betts v. Brady holding if left standing would require us to reject Gideon’s claim that the Constitution guarantees him the assistance of counsel. Upon full reconsideration we conclude that Betts v. Brady should be overruled.
II.
The Sixth Amendment provides, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." We have construed 340*340 this to mean that in federal courts counsel must be provided for defendants unable to employ counsel unless the right is competently and intelligently waived.[3] Betts argued that this right is extended to indigent defendants in state courts by the Fourteenth Amendment. In response the Court stated that, while the Sixth Amendment laid down "no rule for the conduct of the States, the question recurs whether the constraint laid by the Amendment upon the national courts expresses a rule so fundamental and essential to a fair trial, and so, to due process of law, that it is made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment." 316 U. S., at 465. In order to decide whether the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of counsel is of this fundamental nature, the Court in Betts set out and considered "[r]elevant data on the subject . . . afforded by constitutional and statutory provisions subsisting in the colonies and the States prior to the inclusion of the Bill of Rights in the national Constitution, and in the constitutional, legislative, and judicial history of the States to the present date." 316 U. S., at 465. On the basis of this historical data the Court concluded that "appointment of counsel is not a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial." 316 U. S., at 471. It was for this reason the Betts Court refused to accept the contention that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of counsel for indigent federal defendants was extended to or, in the words of that Court, "made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment." Plainly, had the Court concluded that appointment of counsel for an indigent criminal defendant was "a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial." it would have held that the Fourteenth Amendment requires appointment of counsel in a state court, just as the Sixth Amendment requires in a federal court.
341*341 We think the Court in Betts had ample precedent for acknowledging that those guarantees of the Bill of Rights which are fundamental safeguards of liberty immune from federal abridgment are equally protected against state invasion by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This same principle was recognized, explained, and applied in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932), a case upholding the right of counsel, where the Court held that despite sweeping language to the contrary in Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516 (1884), the Fourteenth Amendment "embraced" those " `fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions,’ " even though they had been "specifically dealt with in another part of the federal Constitution." 287 U. S., at 67. In many cases other than Powell and Betts, this Court has looked to the fundamental nature of original Bill of Rights guarantees to decide whether the Fourteenth Amendment makes them obligatory on the States. Explicitly recognized to be of this "fundamental nature" and therefore made immune from state invasion by the Fourteenth, or some part of it, are the First Amendment’s freedoms of speech, press, religion, assembly, association, and petition for redress of grievances.[4] For the same reason, though not always in precisely the same terminology, the Court has made obligatory on the States the Fifth Amendment’s command that 342*342 private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation,[5] the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures,[6] and the Eighth’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.[7] On the other hand, this Court in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 (1937), refused to hold that the Fourteenth Amendment made the double jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment obligatory on the States. In so refusing, however, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Cardozo, was careful to emphasize that "immunities that are valid as against the federal government by force of the specific pledges of particular amendments have been found to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and thus, through the Fourteenth Amendment, become valid as against the states" and that guarantees "in their origin . . . effective against the federal government alone" had by prior cases "been taken over from the earlier articles of the federal bill of rights and brought within the Fourteenth Amendment by a process of absorption." 302 U. S., at 324-325, 326.
We accept Betts v. Brady’s assumption, based as it was on our prior cases, that a provision of the Bill of Rights which is "fundamental and essential to a fair trial" is made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. We think the Court in Betts was wrong, however, in concluding that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of counsel is not one of these fundamental rights. Ten years before Betts v. Brady, this Court, after full consideration of all the historical data examined in Betts, had unequivocally declared that "the right to the aid of 343*343 counsel is of this fundamental character." Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 68 (1932). While the Court at the close of its Powell opinion did by its language, as this Court frequently does, limit its holding to the particular facts and circumstances of that case, its conclusions about the fundamental nature of the right to counsel are unmistakable. Several years later, in 1936, the Court reemphasized what it had said about the fundamental nature of the right to counsel in this language:
"We concluded that certain fundamental rights, safeguarded by the first eight amendments against federal action, were also safeguarded against state action by the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and among them the fundamental right of the accused to the aid of counsel in a criminal prosecution." Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 243-244 (1936).
Right now, in Florida, it’s shocking but true that not everyone on the jury has to agree on execution of the defendant as punishment for the crime before that recommendation can come forward from the jury room.
Florida and Alabama juries don’t need unanimous votes to recommend the death penalty. That may change.
The Florida Legislature opened for business this week, and the 2013 budget session will continue for the next 9 weeks as lawmakers up in Tallahassee bicker and fight and vote on new laws for the State of Florida, many of which will go into effect this summer.
Among them are these bills dealing with …
Back in May 2012, Terry Lenamon in his role as Chairman of the Board of Directors for the Florida Capital Resource Center, wrote to Les Garringer, the Executive Director of the Florida Innocence Commision, to explain how recent Florida laws have impacted the ability of Florida capital defense attorneys to effectively do their jobs, which is…
The opinion in the case of Peterson v. State of Florida was released this week, and in it the Florida Supreme Court summarily reviewed the argument that the death penalty statute passed by the Florida Legislature does not pass constitutional muster because Florida’s death penalty scheme is unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
Federal Appellate Court Reviewing District Judge Opinion: Florida Scheme Is Unconstitutional
The same argument — that the Florida death penalty scheme cannot meet the requirements of the United States Supreme Court opinion in Ring v. Arizona — was held to be valid by a federal district court in Florida last summer. You can read the opinion of U.S. District Judge Jose Martinez here.
Judge Martinez’s decision is currently being reviewed by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals; for details, check out our April 2012 post (with its links).
Florida Supreme Court Rules That Ring v. Arizona Is Met: Florida Death Penalty Statute Passes Test
In the majority opinion, after lengthy consideration of both the guilt and penalty phases of Peterson’s trial, review is then given to the Ring v. Arizona argument with the following result:
… Whether the Court Should Reconsider Bottoson v. Moore and King v. Moore
Finally, Peterson asserts that Florida’s death penalty scheme is unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), because Ring requires a jury determination of facts relied upon to increase maximum sentences in the capital sentencing context and Florida’s death penalty statute does not provide for such jury determinations. Specifically, he asks that this Court reconsider its decisions in Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2002), and King v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 2002). We have consistently rejected claims that Florida’s death penalty statute is unconstitutional. See, e.g., Baker v. State, 71 So. 3d 802, 823-24 (Fla. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1639 (U.S. Feb. 27, 2012) (No. 11-8053); Darling v. State, 966 So. 2d 366, 387 (Fla. 2007); Frances v. State, 970 So. 2d 806, 822 (Fla. 2007). Peterson has not presented any argument that requires us to reconsider this precedent. Thus, we deny relief.
So, the Florida Supreme Court has ruled that its death penalty statute is just fine, thank you very much. However, this was not an unianimous decision. Nope.
Three Florida Supreme Court Justices Find Florida Isn’t Meeting Ring v. Arizona Standard
Justice Pariente provides a dissent regarding the sentence, with which both Justices Labarga and Perry concur. We provide her dissent in its entirety here:
I concur in affirming Peterson’s convictions, but dissent as to his sentence because, based on this record, there is no unanimous finding by a jury that any of the applicable aggravators apply to this case. Peterson was sentenced to death following a seven-to-five jury recommendation absent any fact-finding as to which of the aggravators the jury found. None of the aggravators were aggravators that automatically demonstrate the jury has made the necessary findings to warrant the possibility of a death sentence, such as a prior violent felony or that the murder occurred while in the course of an enumerated felony that also was found by the jury. For the reasons explained more fully in my dissent in Butler v. State, 842 So. 2d 817, 835-40 (Fla. 2003) (Pariente, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), I continue to believe that Florida’s death penalty statute, as applied in circumstances like those presented in this case, is unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). Whether our statute meets the requirements of the Federal Constitution will be an issue for the United States Supreme Court to decide. However, the fact that we do not require unanimity in fact-finding as to the aggravators necessary to impose the death penalty is, in my view, an independent violation of Florida’s constitutional right to trial by jury.
Under our current sentencing scheme, not all defendants who are convicted of first-degree murder are eligible for a sentence of death. The trial judge must make additional findings before the death penalty can be imposed. See generally § 775.082, Fla. Stat. (2011). Without these findings, a trial court cannot impose a higher sentence than life imprisonment on the basis of the verdict alone. See § 775.082(1), Fla. Stat. (stating that without findings by the court that a defendant "shall be punished by death, . . . such person shall be punished by life imprisonment"). It is only after a sentencing hearing and additional findings of fact regarding aggravators and mitigators that the sentence of death may be imposed. Not only is this requirement imposed by Florida law, but it is constitutionally mandated by the Eighth Amendment to prevent death sentences from being arbitrarily imposed.
In addition, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in Ring, the Sixth Amendment requires that a jury find those aggravating factors. As Justice Scalia explained in his concurring opinion in Ring, the bottom line is that "the fundamental meaning of the jury-trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is that all facts essential to imposition of the level of punishment that the defendant receives—whether the statute calls them elements of the offense, sentencing factors, or Mary Jane—must be found by a jury." Ring, 536 U.S. at 610 (Scalia, J., concurring).
In Ring, the United States Supreme Court held that Arizona’s sentencing scheme violated the Constitution—a scheme that was quite similar to Florida’s in that under Arizona’s prior statutory scheme, the maximum punishment allowed by law on the